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Abstract
The tendency to overestimate immediate utility is a common cognitive bias. As a result peo-
ple behave inconsistently over time and fail to reach long-term goals. Behavioral economics tries
to help affected individuals by implementing external incentives. However, designing robust in-
centives is often difficult due to imperfect knowledge of the parameter β ∈ (0, 1] quantifying a
person’s present bias. Using the graphical model of Kleinberg and Oren [8], we approach this
problem from an algorithmic perspective. Based on the assumption that the only information
about β is its membership in some set B ⊂ (0, 1], we distinguish between two models of uncer-
tainty: one in which β is fixed and one in which it varies over time. As our main result we show
that the conceptual loss of efficiency incurred by incentives in the form of penalty fees is at most
2 in the former and 1+maxB/minB in the latter model. We also give asymptotically matching
lower bounds and approximation algorithms.
1 Introduction
Many goals in life such as losing weight, passing an exam or paying off a loan require long-term
planning. But while some people stick to their plans, others lack self-control; they eat unhealthy food,
delay their studies and take out new loans. In behavioral economics the tendency to change a plan
for no apparent reason is known as time-inconsistent behavior. The questions are, what causes these
inconsistencies and why do they affect some more than others? A common explanation is that people
make present biased decisions, i.e., they assign disproportionately greater value to the present than to
the future. In this simplifying model a person’s behavior is the mere result of her present bias and
the setting in which she is placed. However, the interplay between these two factors is intricate and
sometimes counter-intuitive as the following example demonstrates:
Consider two runners Alice and Bob who have two weeks to prepare for an important race. Each
week they must choose between two types of workout. Type A always incurs an effort of 1, whereas
type B incurs an effort of 3 in the first and 9 in the second week. Since A offers less preparation than
B, Alice and Bob’s effort in the final race is 13 if they consistently choose A and 1 if they consistently
choose B. Furthermore, A and B are incompatible in the sense that switching between the two will
result in an effort of 16 in the final race. Figure 1 models this setting as a directed acyclic graph G
with terminal nodes s and t. The intermediate nodes vX and vXY represent a person’s state after
completing the workouts X,Y ∈ {A,B}. To move forward with the training, Alice and Bob must
perform the tasks associated with the edges of G, i.e., complete workouts and run the race. Looking
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Figure 1: Task graph of the running scenario
at G it becomes clear that two consecutive workouts of type B are the most efficient routine in the
long run. However, this is not necessarily the routine a present biased person will choose.
For instance, assume that Alice and Bob discount future costs by a factor of a = 1/2 − ε and
b = 1/2 + ε respectively. We call a and b their present bias. At the beginning of the first week Alice
and Bob compare different workout routines. From Alice’s perspective two workouts of type A are
strictly more preferable to twoworkouts of typeB as she anticipates an effort of 1+a(1+13) = 8−14ε
for the former and 3 + a(9 + 1) = 8 − 10ε for the latter. A similar calculation for Bob shows that
he prefers two workouts of type B. Considering that neither Alice nor Bob finds a mix of A and B
particularly interesting at this point, we conclude that Alice chooses A in the first week and Bob B.
However, come next week, Bob expects an effort of 1 + b16 = 8 + 16ε for A and 9 + b = 19/2 + ε
for B. Assuming ε is small enough, A suddenly becomes Bob’s preferred option and he switches
routines. Alice on the other hand has no reason to change her mind and sticks to A. As a result she
pays much less than Bob during practice and in the final race. This is remarkable considering that
her present bias is only marginally different from Bob’s. Moreover, it seems surprising that only Bob
behaves inconsistently, although he is less biased than Alice.
1.1 Related Work
Traditional economics and game theory are based on the assumption that people maximize their utility
in a rational way. But despite their prevalence, these assumptions disregard psychological aspects of
human decision making observed in empirical and experimental research [11]. For instance, time-
inconsistent behavior such as procrastination seems paradox in the light of traditional economics.
Nevertheless, it can be explained readily by a tendency to overestimate immediate utility in long-term
planning, see e.g. [14]. By studying such cognitive biases, behavioral economics tries to obtain more
realistic economic models.
A significant amount of research in this field has been devoted to temporal discounting in general
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting in particular, see [6] for a survey. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model proposed by Laibson [12] is characterized by two parameters: the present bias β ∈ (0, 1] and
the exponential discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1]. People who plan according to this model have an accurate
perception of the present, but scale down any costs and rewards realized t ≥ 1 time units in the future
by a factor of βδt. To keep our work clearly delineated in scope, we adopt Akerlof’s model of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting [1] and make the following two assumptions: First, we focus on the present
bias β and set the exponential discount rate to δ = 1. Secondly, we assume people to be naive in
the sense that they are unaware of their present bias and only optimize their current perceived utility
when making a decision. Note that Alice and Bob from the previous example behave like agents in
Akerlof’s model for a present bias of β = 1/2 − ε and β = 1/2 + ε respectively.
Until recently the economic literature lacked a unifying and expressive framework for analyzing
time-inconsistent behavior in complex social and economic settings. Kleinberg and Oren closed this
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gap by modeling the behavior of naively present biased individuals as a planning problem in task
graphs like the one depicted in Figure 1 [8]. We introduce this framework formally in Section 2.
As a result of Kleinberg and Oren’s work, an active line of research at the intersection of computer
science and behavioral economics has emerged. For instance, the graphical model has been used to
systematically analyze different types of quasi-hyperbolic discounting agents such as sophisticated
agents who are fully or partially aware of their present bias [9] and agents whose present bias varies
randomly over time [7]. Furthermore, the graphical model was used to shed light on the interplay
between temporal biases and other types of cognitive biases [10].
The graphical model is of particular interest to us as it provides a natural framework for a design
problem frequently encountered in behavioral economics. Given a certain social or economic setting,
the problem is to improve a time-inconsistent person’s performance via various sorts of incentives,
such as monetary rewards, deadlines or penalty fees, see e.g. [13]. Using the graphical model, Klein-
berg and Oren demonstrate how a strategic choice reduction can incentivize people to reach predefined
goals [8]. To implement their incentives, they simply remove the corresponding edges from the task
graph. However, there is a computational drawback to this approach. As we have shown in previous
work, an optimal set of edges to remove from a task graph with n nodes is NP-hard to approximate
within a factor less than
√
n/3 [2]. A more general form of incentives avoiding these harsh complex-
ity theoretic limitations are penalty fees. In the graphical model penalty fees are at least as powerful
as choice reduction and admit a polynomial time 2-approximation [3].
1.2 Incentive Design for an Uncertain Present Bias
Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue have surveyed several attempts to estimate people’s tempo-
ral discount functions [6]. But as estimates differ widely across studies and individuals, the difficulty
of predicting a person’s temporal discount function becomes apparent. Clearly, this poses a serious
challenge for the design of reliable incentives. After all, Alice and Bob’s scenario demonstrates how
arbitrarily small changes in the present bias can cause significant changes in a person’s behavior.
In this work we address the effects of incomplete information about a person’s present bias in two
different notions of uncertainty.
In Section 3 we consider naive individuals whose exponential discount rate is δ = 1, but whose
present bias β is unknown. The only prior information we have about β is its membership in some
larger set B. Our goal is to construct incentives that are robust with respect to the uncertainty induced
by B. More precisely, we are interested in incentives that work well for any present bias contained
in B. An alternative perspective is that we try to construct incentives which are not limited to a
single person, but serve an entire population of individuals with different present bias values. A
simple instance of this problem in which a single task must be partitioned and stretched over a longer
period of time has been studied by Kleinberg and Oren [8]. But like most research on incentivizing
heterogeneous populations, see e.g. [13], Kleinberg and Oren’s results are restricted to a very specific
setting. They themselves suggest the design of more general incentives as a major research direction
for the graphical framework [8].
Using penalty fees as our incentive of choice and a fixed reward to keep people motivated, we
present the first results in this area. Our contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we try to quantify
the conceptual loss of efficiency caused by incomplete knowledge of β. For this purpose we introduce
a novel concept called price of uncertainty, which denotes the smallest ratio between the reward
required by an incentive that accommodates all β ∈ B and the reward required by an incentive
designed for a specific β ∈ B. We present an elegant algorithmic argument to prove that the price
of uncertainty is at most 2. Remarkably, this bound holds true independent of the underlying graph
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G and present bias set B. To complement our result, we construct a family of graphs G and present
bias sets B for which the price of uncertainty converges to a value strictly greater than 1. On the other
hand, we consider the computational problem of constructing penalty fees that work for all β ∈ B,
but require as little reward as possible. Drawing on the same algorithmic ideas we used to bound the
price of uncertainty yields a polynomial time 2-approximation. Furthermore, we present a non-trivial
proof to show that the decision version of the problem is contained in NP. Since all hardness results
of [3] also apply under uncertainty, we know that there is no 1.08192-approximation unless P = NP.
1.3 Incentive Design for a Variable Present Bias
In Section 4 we generalize our notion of uncertainty to individuals whose present bias β may change
arbitrarily over time within the set B. This model is inspired by work of Gravin et al. [7], except that
we do not rely on the assumption that β is drawn independently from a fixed probability distribution.
Instead, our goal is to design penalty fees that work well for all possible sequences of β over time.
We believe this to be an interesting extension of the fixed parameter case as the variability of β
may capture changes in a person’s temporal discount function caused by unforeseen cognitive biases
different from her present bias. As a result we obtain more robust penalty fees.
Again, our contribution is twofold. On the one hand, we introduce the price of variability to
quantify the conceptual loss of efficiency caused by unpredictable changes in β. Similar to the price
of uncertainty, we define this quantity to be the smallest ratio between the reward required by an
incentive that accommodates all possible changes of β ∈ B over time and the reward required by
an incentive designed for a specific and fixed β ∈ B. However, unlike the price of uncertainty, the
price of variability has no constant upper bound. Instead, the ratio seems closely related to the range
τ = maxB/minB of the set B. By generalizing our algorithm from Section 3 we obtain an upper
bound of 1+τ for the price of variability. To complement this result, we construct a family of graphsG
for which the price of variability converges to τ/2. On the other hand, we consider the computational
aspects of constructing penalty fees for a variable β. As a result of the unbounded price of variability,
we are not able to come up with a constant polynomial time approximation. Instead, we obtain a
(1 + τ)-approximation. However, by using a sophisticated reduction from VECTOR SCHEDULING,
we prove that no efficient constant approximation is possible unless NP = ZPP. We conclude our
work by studying a curious special case of variability in which individuals may temporarily lose their
present bias. For this scenario, which is characterized by the assumption that 1 ∈ B, optimal penalty
fees can be computed in polynomial time.
2 The Model
In the following we introduce Kleinberg and Oren’s graphical framework [8]. Let G = (V,E) be a
directed acyclic graph with n nodes that models some long-term project. The start and end states are
denoted by the terminal nodes s and t. Furthermore, each edge e of G corresponds to a specific task
whose inured effort is captured by a non-negative cost c(e). To finish the project, a present biased
agent must sequentially complete all tasks along a path from s to t. However, instead of following a
fixed path, the agent constructs her path dynamically according to the following simple procedure:
When located at any node v different from t, the agent tries to evaluate the minimum cost she
needs to pay in order to reach t. For this purpose she considers all outgoing edges (v,w) of her
current position v. Because the tasks associated with these edges must be performed immediately, the
agent assesses their cost correctly. In contrast, all future tasks, i.e., tasks on a path from v to t not
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incident to v, are discounted by her present bias of β ∈ (0, 1]. As a result, we define her perceived cost
for taking (v,w) to be dβ(v,w) = c(v,w) + βd(w), where d(w) denotes the cost of a cheapest path
from w to t. Furthermore, we define dβ(v) = min{c(v,w) + βd(w) | (v,w) ∈ E} to be the agent’s
minimum perceived cost at v. Since the agent is oblivious to her own present bias, she only traverses
edges (v,w) for which dβ(v,w) = dβ(v). Ties are broken arbitrarily. Once the agent reaches the next
node, she reiterates this process.
To motivate the agent, a non-negative reward r is placed at t. Because the agent must reach t
before she can collect r, her perceived reward for reaching t is βr at each node different from t. When
located at v 6= t, the agent is only motivated to proceed if dβ(v) ≤ βr. Otherwise, if dβ(v) > βr, she
quits. We say that G is motivating, if she does not quit while constructing her path from s to t. Note
that sometimes the agent can construct more than one path from s to t due to ties in the perceived cost
of incident edges. In this case, G is considered motivating if she does not quit on any such path.
For the sake of a clear presentation, we will assume throughout this work that each node of G
is located on a path from s to t. This assumption is sensible because the agent can only visit nodes
reachable from s. Furthermore, she is not willing to enter nodes that do not lead to the reward at t.
Consequently, only nodes that are on a path from s to t are relevant to her behavior. All nodes not
satisfying this property can be removed from G in a simple preprocessing step.
2.1 Alice and Bob’s Scenario
To illustrate the model, we revisit Alice and Bob’s scenario. The task graph G is depicted in Figure 1.
Remember that a = 1/2 − ε and b = 1/2 + ε denote Alice and Bob’s respective present bias. For
convenience let 0 < ε ≤ 1/54. Furthermore, assume that a reward of r = 27 is awarded upon
reaching t.
We proceed to analyze Alice and Bob’s walk throughG. At their initial position s they must decide
whether they move to vA or vB. For this purpose they try to find a path that minimizes the perceived
cost. As the more present biased person, Alice’s favorite path is s, vA, vAA, t with a perceived cost
of da(s) = da(s, vA) = 8 − 14ε. By choice of ε this cost is covered by her perceived reward
ar = 27/2 − 27ε. Consequently, she is motivated to traverse the first edge and moves to vA. A
similar argument shows that Bob moves to vB . Once they reach their new nodes, Alice and Bob
reevaluate plans. From Alice’s perspective vA, vAA, t is still the cheapest path to t. Bob, however,
suddenly prefers vB , vAB , t to his original plan. Nevertheless, both of their perceived cost remains
covered by their perceived reward and they move to vAA and vAB respectively. At this point the only
option is to take the direct edge to t. For Alice the perceived cost at vAA is sufficiently small to
let her reach t. In contrast, Bob’s perceived cost of db(vAB) = 16 exceeds his perceived reward of
br = 27/2 + 27ε and he quits.
2.2 Cost Configurations
Bob’s behavior in the previous example demonstrates how present biased decisions can deter people
from reaching predefined goals. To ensure an agent’s success it is therefore sometimes necessary to
implement external incentives such as penalty fees. In the graphical model, penalty fees allow us to
arbitrarily raise the cost of edges in G. More formally, let c˜ be a so called cost configuration, which
assigns a non-negative extra cost c˜(e) to all edges e of G. The result is a new task graph Gc˜, whose
edges e have a cost of c(e)+ c˜(e). A present biased agent navigates through Gc˜ according to the same
rules applying in G. We say that c˜ is motivating if and only if Gc˜ is. To avoid ambiguity we annotate
our notation whenever we consider a specific c˜, e.g., we write dc˜ and dβ,c˜ instead of d and dβ .
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We conclude this section with a brief demonstration of the positive effects penalty fees can have in
Alice and Bob’s scenario. Let c˜ be a cost configuration that assigns an extra cost of c˜(vB , vAB) = 1/2
to (vB , vAB) and c˜(e) = 0 to all other edges e 6= (vB , vAB). Note that G and Gc˜ are identical task
graphs except for the cost of (vB , vAB). Because Alice does not plan to take (vB , vAB) on her way
through G and has even less reason to do so in Gc˜, we know that c˜ does not affect her behavior. For
similar reasons, c˜ does not affect Bob’s choice to move to vB . However, once Bob has reached vB
his perceived cost of the path vB , vAB , t is db,c˜(vB , vAB) = 19/2 + 16ε, whereas his perceived cost
of vB , vBB , t is only db,c˜(vB , vBB) = 19/2 + ε. Since the latter option appears to be cheaper and
is covered by his perceived reward, Bob proceeds to vBB and then onward to t. As a result c˜ yields
a task graph that is motivating for Alice and Bob alike. This is a considerable improvement to the
original task graph.
3 Uncertain Present Bias
In this section we consider agents whose present bias β is uncertain in the sense that our only infor-
mation about β is its membership in some set B ⊂ (0, 1]. We call B the present bias set. For technical
reasons we assume that B can be expressed as the union of constantly many closed subintervals from
the set (0, 1]. This way the intersection of B with a closed interval is either empty or contains an
efficiently computable minimal and maximal element. To measure the degree of uncertainty induced
by B, we define the range of B as τ = maxB/minB.
3.1 A Decision Problem
Our goal is to construct a cost configuration c˜ that is motivating for all β ∈ B, but requires as little
reward as possible. To assess the complexity of this task, let UNCERTAIN PRESENT BIAS (UPB)
be the following decision problem:
Definition 1 (UPB). Given a task graph G, present bias set B and reward r > 0, decide whether a
cost configuration c˜ motivating for all β ∈ B exists.
If τ = 1, i.e., B only contains a single present bias parameter, UPB is identical to the deci-
sion problem MOTIVATING COST CONFIGURATION (MCC) studied in [3]. Since MCC is NP-
complete, UPBmust be NP-hard. But unlike MCC it is not immediately clear if UPB is also contained
in NP. The reason is that proving MCC ∈ NP only requires to verify whether a given cost config-
uration is motivating for a single value of β; a property that can be checked in polynomial time [2].
However, proving UPB ∈ NP requires to verify whether a given cost configuration is motivating for
all β ∈ B. Taking into account that B may very well be an infinite set, it becomes clear that we cannot
check all values of β individually. Interestingly, we do not have to; checking a finite subset B′ ⊆ B
of size O(n2) turns out to be sufficient.
Proposition 1. For any task graph G, reward r and present bias set B a finite subset B′ ⊆ B of size
O(n2) exists such that G is motivating for all β ∈ B if it is motivating for all β ∈ B′.
Proof. Our proof consists of two steps. First, we determine for what β ∈ [0, 1] the preference profile
pβ(v) = {(v,w′) | dβ(v,w′) = dβ(v)}, i.e., the set of edges an agent with present bias β is inclined
to traverse, contains a given edge (v,w). Let Bv,w be the set of all β satisfying this property. More
formally we define Bv,w as the intersection {β | (v,w) ∈ pβ(v)} ∩ [0, 1]. As we are going to show,
Bv,w is a closed, possibly empty, subinterval of [0, 1]. For the second step we define B
′ to be the
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set {min(Be ∩ B) | Be ∩ B 6= ∅}. Note that by our assumption on B the minimum of Be ∩ B
is guaranteed to exist as long as Be ∩ B 6= ∅. Furthermore, B′ contains at most |E| elements and
therefore has a size of O(n2). Using a proof by contradiction, we argue that G is motivating for all
β ∈ B if it is motivating for all β ∈ B′. This completes the proof.
To see that Bv,w is a closed subinterval of [0, 1], it is instructive to observe how the perceived
cost of (v,w) changes with respect to β. For this purpose, let ℓv,w(β) = c(v,w) + βd(w) denote the
perceived cost dβ(v,w) with respect to β. Clearly, the function ℓv,w is linear and so are the functions
ℓv,w′ associated with the incident edges of (v,w). Together, these functions yield the line arrangement
Lv = {ℓv,w′ | (v,w′) ∈ E}. By definition of the agent’s preference profile, pβ(v) contains (v,w) if
and only if dβ(v,w) ≤ dβ(v,w′) for all (v,w′) ∈ E. The values of β ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy this property
are exactly those for which the line ℓv,w is on the lower envelope of the line arrangement Lv. From
the basic structure of line arrangements such as Lv we can immediately conclude that Bv,w must be a
closed subinterval of [0, 1], see e.g. [5].
To conclude the proof it remains to show that G is motivating for each β ∈ B if it is motivating
for each β ∈ B′. For the sake of contradiction assume thatG is motivating for each β ∈ B′ but not for
some b ∈ B. As a result there must exist a path P from s to t along which an agent with present bias b
may walk and which contains an edge (v,w) such that db(v,w)/b > r. Let BP =
⋂
e∈P Be be the set
of all present bias parameters for which agents can construct P . From this definition it is immediately
apparent that b is contained BP and therefore BP ∩ B 6= ∅. We now consider the structure of BP .
Since each set Be associated with an e ∈ P is a closed interval, so is BP . In particular, as BP ∩B is
not empty, one of these sets Be must satisfy min(Be ∩ B) = min(BP ∩ B). Let a = min(Be ∩ B)
denote the corresponding present bias value. By definition of a it holds true that a ∈ B′ and a ≤ b.
Moreover, because a ∈ BP , we know that an agent with present bias a may very well construct the
path P . However, once this agent reaches (v,w), her perceived cost exceeds her perceived reward as
da(v,w)
a
=
c(v,w)
a
+ d(w) ≥ c(v,w)
b
+ d(w) =
db(v,w)
b
> r.
Consequently, G is not motivating for a. However, this is a contradiction to the assumption that G is
motivating for all β ∈ B′.
Note that the proof of Proposition 1 does not only imply that B′ exists, but also that it can be
constructed in polynomial time. We may therefore conclude that UPB is indeed contained in NP.
Corollary 1. UPB is NP-complete.
3.2 The Price of Uncertainty
Since UPB is NP-complete, it makes sense to consider the corresponding optimization problem UPB-
OPT. For this purpose, let r(G,B) be the infimum over all rewards admitting a cost configuration
motivating for all β ∈ B and define:
Definition 2 (UPB-OPT). Given a task graph G and present bias set B, determine r(G,B).
Clearly, UPB-OPT must be at least as hard as the optimization version of MCC. Consequently,
we know that UPB has no PTAS and is NP-hard to approximate within a ratio less than 1.08192 [3].
But does the transition from a certain to an uncertain β reduce approximability?
Setting complexity theoretic considerations aside for a moment, an even more general question
arises: How does the transition from a certain to an uncertain β affect the efficiency of cost con-
figurations assuming unlimited computational resources? To quantify this conceptual difference in
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efficiency, we look at the smallest ratio between optimal cost configurations motivating for all β ∈ B
and optimal cost configurations motivating for a specific β ∈ B. We call this ratio the price of
uncertainty.
Definition 3 (Price of Uncertainty). Given a task graph G and a present bias set B, the price of
uncertainty is defined as r(G,B)/ sup{r(G, {β}) | β ∈ B}.
Let us illustrate the price of uncertainty by going back to Alice and Bob’s scenario and assume
that B = {a, b} with a = 1/2 − ε and 1/2 + ε. In other words, the agent either behaves like Alice
or she behaves like Bob, but we do not know which. It is easy to see that in either case the agent
minimizes her maximum perceived cost on the way from s to t by taking the path P = s, vB, vBB , t.
This minmax cost, which is either da(vB , vBB) = 19/2 − ε or db(vB , vBB) = 19/2 + ε, provides
two lower bounds for the necessary reward when divided by the respective present bias. More for-
mally, it holds true that r(G, {a}) ≥ (19/2 − ε)/(1/2 − ε) and r(G, {b}) ≥ (19/2 + ε)/(1/2 + ε).
However, as we have seen in Section 2, neither Alice nor Bob are willing to follow P without exter-
nal incentives. To discourage the agent from leaving P , we assign an extra cost of c˜(s, vA) = 5ε to
(s, vA), c˜(vB , vAB) = 1/2+16ε to (vB , vAB) and c˜(e) = 0 otherwise. This extra cost does not affect
the agent’s maximum perceived cost along P , which she still experiences at (vB , vBB). As a result,
our bounds for r(G, {a}) and r(G, {b}) are tight and we get sup{r(G, {β}) | β ∈ B} = r(G, {a}).
Moreover, because we have used the same cost configuration c˜ to derive r(G, {a}) and r(G, {b}), it
must hold true that r(G,B) = sup{r(G, {β}) | β ∈ B}, implying that the price of uncertainty in
Alice and Bob’s scenario is 1.
3.3 Bounding the Price of Uncertainty
As Alice and Bob’s scenario demonstrates, cost configurations designed for an uncertain β are not
necessarily less efficient than those designed for a specific β. Therefore one might wonder whether
scenarios exist in which a real loss of efficiency is bound to occur, i.e., can the price of uncertainty be
greater than 1? The following proposition shows that such scenarios indeed exist.
Proposition 2. There exists a family of task graphs and present bias sets for which the price of
uncertainty converges to 1.1.
Proof. Let 0 < a ≤ 3/8 be some present bias such that 4/a is integral and consider the task G
consisting of a directed path v0, v1, . . . , v12+4/a. We call this path the main path and charge a cost
of 2 on its first edge while all other edges of the path have a cost of 1. In addition to the main path,
we introduce a shortcut from v1 to v12+4/a along an intermediate node w. The cost of the two edges
(v1, w) and (w, v12+4/a) is 4 and 6+3/a respectively. For a convenience let s = v0 and t = v12+4/a.
Figure 2 shows a sketch of G.
Assume that G is traversed by an agent whose present bias is either a or b = 1/2, but we do not
know which, i.e., B = {a, 1/2}. Our goal is to construct two cost configurations a˜ and b˜ such that
Ga˜ and Gb˜ are motivating for a reward of 10 + 5/a and the respective present bias. This implies
sup{r(G, {a}), r(G, {1/2})} ≤ 10 + 5/a. We then argue that a reward less than 9 + 11/(2a) is
not sufficient to motivate both types of agents simultaneously, i.e., r(G,B) ≥ 9 + 11/(2a). As
(9 + 11/(2a))/(10 + 5/a) converges to 11/10 for a→ 0, this establishes the proposition.
We begin with a˜. For this purpose let a˜ assign no extra cost at all, i.e., a˜(e) = 0 for all edges e.
Furthermore, assume the agent has a present bias of a and a reward of 10 + 5/a is placed at t.
When located at s, the agent’s only choice is (s, v1). If she plans to take the shortcut afterwards, her
perceived cost of (s, v1) is at most da,a˜(s, v1) ≤ 10a + 5. As this matches her perceived reward,
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Figure 2: Task graph with a price of uncertainty of (9 + 11/(2a))/(10 + 5/a)
she proceeds to v1 where she faces two options: The first one is to take the shortcut for a perceived
cost of da,a˜(v1, w) = 6a + 7. Considering that we chose a to satisfy a < 1/2, it follows that
da,a˜(v1, w) > 10a + 5 and therefore the shortcut is not motivating. The second option is to take the
main path along 11 + 4/a edges of cost 1, resulting in a perceived cost of da,a˜(v1, v2) = 10a + 5.
Similar to the situation at s, this cost matches the perceived reward and she proceeds to v2. Since all
remaining edges (vi, vi+1) have a perceived cost less than da,a˜(v1, v2), the agent eventually reaches t
and we conclude that Ga˜ is motivating.
We continue to construct b˜ by setting b˜(v1, w) = 1/(2a) and b˜(e) = 0 otherwise. In contrast to
the previous scenario assume the agent has a present bias of b. The reward is still 10 + 5/a, but its
perceived value has changed to 5 + 5/(2a). When located at the initial node s, the agent’s perceived
cost is at most db,b˜(s, v1) ≤ 7 + 7/(4a) if she plans to take the shortcut afterwards. By choice
of a it holds true that a < 3/8 and we get db,b˜(s, v1) ≤ 5 + 5/(2a). Consequently, the agent is
motivated to proceed to v1. At this point, she has to choose between the shortcut and the main path.
Her perceived cost of the former is db,b˜(v1, w) = 7 + 2/a, whereas the latter has a perceived cost of
db,b˜(v1, v2) = 6 + 2/a. Clearly, the main path is her preferred choice and since a < 1/2, it is also a
motivating one. Because all remaining edges (vi, vi+1) have a perceived cost less than db,a˜(v1, v2), it
follows that Gb˜ is motivating.
It remains to show that no cost configuration can be motivating for both types of agents at the
same time if the reward is less than 9 + 11/(2a). For the sake of contradiction assume such a cost
configuration c˜ exists. Note that an agent with present bias b must not enter the shortcut as her
perceived cost db,c˜(w, t) = 6 + 3/a exceeds her perceived reward of 9/2 + 11/(4a) for any a > 0.
However, if we do not assign extra cost to G, such an agent prefers the shortcut to the main path when
located at v1. The difference in perceived cost is db(v1, v2)− db(v1, w) = 1/(2a)− 1. Consequently,
c˜ must assign extra cost greater than 1/(2a)− 1 to the shortcut. Next consider an agent with a present
bias of a located at s. At this point her perceived cost for taking the shortcut is greater than 9a+11/2,
due to the extra cost assigned by c˜. Note that this cost exceeds her perceived reward. Her other option
is to plan along the main path. In this case her perceived cost is 11a + 6. Clearly, this is even more
expensive contradicting the assumption that c˜ is motivating for both types of agents.
As the price of uncertainty can be strictly greater than 1, the question for an upper bound arises.
Ideally, we would like to design a cost configuration c˜ motivating for all β ∈ B assuming the reward
is set to ̺r(G, {b}) for some constant factor ̺ > 1 and b = minB. Clearly, the existence of such
a c˜ would imply a constant bound of ̺ for the price of uncertainty independent of G and B. Using
a generalized version of the approximation algorithm we proposed in [3], it is indeed possible to
construct a c˜ with the desired property for ̺ = 2.
The main idea of UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX is simple: First, the algorithm computes
a value α such that α/b is a lower bound on the reward necessary for agents with present bias b,
i.e., r(G, {b}) ≥ α/b. In particular, this bound implies sup{r(G, {β}) | β ∈ B} ≥ α/b. Next
the algorithm constructs a c˜ such that a reward of 2α/b is sufficiently motivating for all β ∈ B, i.e.,
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Algorithm 1: UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX
1 b← minB; P ← minmax path from s to t w.r.t db(e); α← max{db(e) | e ∈ P};
2 foreach v ∈ V \ {t} do ς(v)← successor of v on a cheapest path from v to t;
3 T = {(v, ς(v)) | v ∈ V \ {t}};
4 foreach e ∈ E do c˜(e)← 0;
5 foreach e ∈ E \ (P ∪ T ) do c˜(e)← 2α/b + 1;
6 foreach (v,w) ∈ T such that v ∈ P and w /∈ P do
7 P ′ ← v, ς(v), ς(ς(v)), . . . , t;
8 u← first node of P ′ different from v that is also a node of P ;
9 c˜(v,w)← cost of most expensive edge of P ′ between v and u;
10 return c˜;
r(G,B) ≤ 2α/b. As a result the price of uncertainty can be at most 2. In the following we try to
convey the intuition behind the algorithm in more detail.
We begin with the computation of α. For this purpose let P be a path minimizing the maximum
cost an agent with present bias b perceives on her way from s to t. We call P aminmax path and define
α = max{db(e) | e ∈ P} to be the maximum perceived edge cost of P . Since cost configurations
cannot decrease edge cost, it should be clear that α is a valid lower bound on the reward required for
the present bias b, i.e., r(G, {b}) ≥ α/b.
We proceed with c˜. The goal is to assign extra cost in such a way that any agent with a present
bias β ∈ B traverses only two kinds of edges. The first kind of edges are those on P . It is instructive
to note that each such edge (v,w) ∈ P is motivating for a reward of α/b if β ≥ b. The reason is that
dβ(v,w) = β
(c(v,w)
β
+ d(v,w)
)
≤ β
(c(v,w)
b
+ d(v,w)
)
= β
db(v,w)
b
= β
α
b
.
In particular, P is motivating for each present bias β ∈ B. The second kind of edges are on cheapest
paths to t. To identify these edges, the algorithm assigns a distinct successor ς(v) to each node
v ∈ V \ {t} such that (v, ς(v)) is the initial edge of a cheapest path from v to t. Since we assume t
to be reachable from all other nodes of G at least one suitable successor must exist. By definition of
ς , we know that P ′ = v, ς(v), ς(ς(v)), . . . , t is a cheapest path from v to t. We call P ′ the ς-path of v
and T = {(v, ς(v)) | v ∈ V \ {t}} a cheapest path tree.
Remember that we try to keep agents on the edges of P and T . For this purpose, we assign an
extra cost of c˜(e) = 2α/b+1 to all other edges. This raises their perceived cost to at least 2α/b+1; a
price no agent is willing to pay for a perceived reward of β2α/b. However, since we have not assigned
any extra cost to T so far, the perceived cost of edges in P and T is unaffected by the current c˜. In
particular, all edges of P are still motivating for a reward of α/b and any present bias β ∈ B. To
keep agents from entering costly ς-paths P ′ = v, ς(v), ς(ς(v)), . . . , t, we assign an extra cost to the
out-edges (v, ς(v)) of P , i.e., v ∈ P but ς(v) /∈ P . The extra cost c˜(v, ς(v)) is chosen to match the
cost of a most expensive edge on P ′ between v and the next intersection of P ′ and P . It is easy to
see that the resulting c˜ can no more than double the perceived cost of any edge in P , see the proof of
Theorem 1 for a precise argument. Furthermore, the perceived cost of any out-edge (v, ς(v)) of P is
either high enough to keep agents on P or they do not encounter edges exceeding the perceived cost
of (v, ς(v)) until they reenter P . We conclude that a reward of 2α/b is sufficiently motivating, leading
us to one of the central results of our work.
Theorem 1. The price of uncertainty is at most 2.
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Proof. Let β be an arbitrary present bias from B. According to our considerations from Section 3 it is
evident that the theorem holds true if UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX yields a cost configuration
c˜ such that a reward of 2α/b is motivating for β. In other words, we need to show that no agent
with present bias β can reach a node v where her perceived cost dβ,c˜(v) exceeds her perceived reward
of β2α/b. For this purpose we make a case distinction on v.
First, assume that v is a node of P and let w be the direct successor of v on P . In our previous
discussion of UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX we have already argued that (v,w) is motivating
for a reward of α/b if we ignore extra cost, i.e., dβ(v,w) ≤ βα/b. Our goal is to show that c˜ can
at most double the perceived cost of (v,w) in the sense that dβ,c˜(v,w) ≤ 2dβ(v,w). Clearly, this
directly implies the desired bound dβ,c˜(v) ≤ dβ,c˜(v,w) ≤ β2α/b on the perceived cost of v. To
prove our claim, let P ′ be the ς-path of w. Remember UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX does not
raise the cost of (v,w). Moreover, the algorithm only assigns extra cost to edges (w′, ς(w′)) of P ′
that are out-edges of P , i.e., w′ ∈ P but ς(w′) /∈ P . Consequently, at most one edge of P ′ can charge
extra cost between any two consecutive intersections of P and P ′. Because this extra cost is equal to
the cost of an edge between the two intersections, each edge of P ′ can contribute at most once to the
total extra cost of P ′. As a result, we know that the extra cost of P ′ is less or equal to its original cost.
Together with the fact P ′ is a cheapest path from w to t we conclude that
dβ,c˜(v,w) = c(v,w) + βdc˜(w) ≤ c(v,w) + β
∑
e∈P ′
(
c(e) + c˜(e)
)
≤ c(v,w) + β
∑
e∈P ′
2c(e) = c(v,w) + 2βd(w) ≤ 2dβ(v,w).
Next assume that v is not on P and let v′ be the last node of P the agent visited before reaching v.
Furthermore, let Pv = v,w, . . . , t and Pv′ = v
′, w′, . . . , t be the two paths the agent plans to take
when located at v and v′ respectively. Because the agent is willing to traverse (v′, w′), we know
dβ,c˜(v
′, w′) ≤ β2α/b. To obtain the desired bound dβ,c˜(v) ≤ dβ,c˜(v, ς(v)) ≤ β2α/b, all that remains
to be shown is dβ,c˜(v,w) ≤ dβ,c˜(v′, w′). At this point it is helpful to recall that the agent never plans
to take an edge that is neither part of P or T . The reason is that those edges have an extra cost of
2α/b + 1, which certainly exceeds the perceived reward. As a result, we know that the first edges of
Pv′ , i.e., the edges from v
′ to w, are all edges of T . Let Q, be the subpath of Pv′ that goes from w
′
to w. By definition of Pv′ we know that Q is part of a cheapest path from w
′ to t with respect to c˜ and
it becomes apparent that
dc˜(w) ≤
∑
e∈Q
(
c(e) + c˜(e)
)
+ dc˜(w) = dc˜(w
′).
Moreover, by design of c˜ we know that c(v,w) ≤ c˜(v′, w′) and c˜(v,w) = 0. Combining these
inequalities immediately yields
dβ,c˜(v,w) = c(v,w) + βdc˜(w) ≤ c(v′, w′) + c˜(v′, w′) + βdc˜(w′) = dβ,c˜(v′, w′).
This completes the proof.
It is interesting to note that UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX can be executed in polynomial
time. Furthermore, the proof of Theorem 1 argues that α/b ≤ r(G,B) ≤ 2α/b. As a result we have
also found an efficient constant factor approximation of UPB-OPT.
Corollary 2. UPB-OPT admits a polynomial time 2-approximation.
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4 Variable Present Bias
So far we have considered agents with an unknown but fixed present bias. We now generalize this
model to agents whose β may vary arbitrarily within B as they progress through G. It is convenient
to think of β as a present bias configuration, i.e., an assignment of present bias values β(v) ∈ B to
the nodes v of G. Whenever the agent reaches a node v, she acts according to the current present bias
value β(v). We say that G is motivating with respect to a present bias configuration β if and only if
the agent does not quit on a walk from s to t.
To illustrate the consequences of a variable present bias we revisit Alice and Bob’s scenario once
more. Recall that the agent in this scenario is either like Alice with a present bias of a = 1/2 − ε or
like Bob with a present bias of b = 1/2 + ε, i.e., B = {a, b}. But while she had to commit to one
present bias before, she is now free to change between a and b. For instance, her present bias could
be b at s and vB, but a otherwise, i.e., β(v) = b for v ∈ {s, vB} and β(v) = a for v ∈ V \ {s, vB}. In
this case she walks along the same path Bob would take, i.e., s, vB, vAB , t. However, there is a subtle
difference. At vAB the agent behaves like Alice and needs strictly more reward than Bob to remain
motivated while traversing (vAB , t). Under closer examination, which we will not go into detail here,
it is in fact easy to see that the variability of β makes our agent more expensive to motivate than any
agent with a fixed present bias from B.
4.1 Computational Consideration
Let G be an arbitrary task graph and B a suitable present bias set. We want to construct a cost
configuration c˜ that is motivating for all present bias configuration β ∈ BV , but requires as little
reward as possible. Using arguments similar to those of Section 3, the computational challenges of this
task are readily apparent. In particular, the corresponding decision problem VARIABLE PRESENT
BIAS (VPB) is equivalent to MCC whenever B only contains a single element.
Definition 4 (VPB). Given a task graph G, present bias set B and reward r > 0, decide whether a
cost configuration c˜ motivating for all β ∈ BV exists.
Because MCC is NP-complete [3], it immediately follows that VPB is NP-hard. However, proving
that UPB ∈ NP requires a more careful argument.
Proposition 3. VPB is contained in NP.
Proof. LetB an arbitrary present bias set given as input andG the task graph resulting from some cost
configuration. To prove that VPB is contained in NP we need to find an efficient way of confirming
whetherG is motivating for all β ∈ BV . Our strategy for this task consists of three steps: (a) Construct
the set E′ containing all edges (v,w) minimizing the agent’s perceived cost at v for some present bias
β(v) ∈ B. (b) Compute the set V ′ containing all nodes reachable from s via edges of E′. (c) For each
node v ∈ V ′ check that the agent remains motivated for all possible present bias values β(v) ∈ B.
To complete the proof we argue that each step can be completed in polynomial time and that (c) holds
true if and only if G is motivating for all β ∈ BV .
We begin with step (a). Observe that E′ only contains edges (v,w) for which a β(v) ∈ B exists
such that dβ(v)(v,w) ≤ dβ(v)(v,w′) for all (v,w′) ∈ E. From the proof of Proposition 1 we already
know that the present bias parameters β′ ∈ [0, 1] satisfying dβ′(v,w) ≤ dβ′(v,w′) form a closed
subinterval Bv,w ⊆ [0, 1]. Moreover, the end points of this interval can be computed in polynomial
time. Together with our assumptions on B, we may assume that Bv,w ∩ B 6= ∅ can be determined
efficiently and therefore E′ can be constructed in polynomial time.
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We continue with (b). Given the set E′, it is trivial to construct V ′ in polynomial time. Further-
more, V ′ contains exactly those nodes an agent with variable present bias can reach if the reward is
sufficiently large. To see this, let P be a path from s to v only using edges of E′. If we go through
the edges (v′, w′) of P and choose β(v′) as an element of the non-empty intersection Bv′,w′ ∩B, we
obtain a valid present bias configuration that may lead the agent onto v for a sufficiently large reward.
Conversely, we can find no such present bias configuration for nodes v /∈ V ′. The reason is that all
path P to v must contain at least one edge (v,w) /∈ E′. But by definition of E′ the agent does not
traverse (v,w) for any β(v) ∈ B.
We conclude with (c). As a result of (b), we know that the agent can never reach nodes outside
of V ′. However, she can reach each v ∈ V ′, unless she quits at some other node of V ′ before she gets
to v. As a result, we know that G is motivating for all β ∈ BV if and only if the agent never quits
when located at any of the nodes v ∈ V ′. Conveniently, we do not need to check the latter condition
for all β(v) ∈ B. Instead, we only need to check for β(v) = b, with b denoting the minimum of B.
The reason is that the minimum reward that is motivating in the case of β(v) = b is greater or equal
to the reward required by any other present bias β(v) ≥ b, as the following inequality demonstrates
db(v)
b
= min
{c(v,w)
b
+ d(w)
∣∣∣ (v,w) ∈ E
}
≥ min
{c(v,w)
β(v)
+ d(w)
∣∣∣ (v,w) ∈ E
}
=
dβ(v)(v)
β(v)
.
Therefore (c) can be decided in polynomial time. This completes the proof.
As a result of Proposition 3, we may conclude that VPB is NP-complete.
Corollary 3. VPB is NP-complete.
Since it is NP-hard to find optimal cost configurations for general B, we turn to an optimization
version of the problem. Assuming that r(G,BV ) denotes the infimum over all rewards admitting a
cost configuration c˜ motivating for all β ∈ BV , we define VPB-OPT as:
Definition 5 (VPB-OPT). Given a task graph G and present bias set B, determine r(G,BV ).
Interestingly, approximating VPB-OPT seems to be much harder than UPB-OPT. The reason why
the 2-approximation for UPB-OPT, i.e., UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX, does not work anymore
is simple. Recall that the cost configuration c˜ returned by the algorithm lets the agent take shortcuts
along cheapest paths to t. To ensure that these shortcuts do not become too expensive, c˜ assigns
extra cost to their initial edge. This way the perceived cost within a shortcut should not be greater
than that for entering. As long as the present bias is fixed, this works fine. However, if the present
bias can change, the agent may become more biased within a shortcut and require higher rewards
to stay motivated. One way to fix this problem is to let the assigned extra cost depend on τ , i.e.,
the range of B. More precisely, we multiply the cost assigned in line 9 of Algorithm 1 by τ and
change line 5 to assign a cost of c˜(e) = (1 + τ)α/b + 1. As a result we obtain a new algorithm
VARIABLEPRESENTBIASAPPROX with an approximation ration of 1 + τ .
Theorem 2. VPB-OPT admits a polynomial time (1 + τ)-approximation.
Proof. Let b = minB. From the analysis of UNCERTAINPRESENTBIASAPPROX in Section 3 it
should be clear that α/b = max{db(e) | e ∈ P}/b is a lower bound for r(G,BV ) and can be com-
puted in polynomial time. To establish the theorem, we argue that (1 + τ)α/b is an upper bound for
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r(G,BV ). In particular, we prove that the cost configuration c˜ returned by VARIABLEPRESENTBI-
ASAPPROX is motivating for all β ∈ BV if the reward is set to (1 + τ)α/b.
Using the same reasoning as in proof of Theorem 1, we know that the agent’s perceived cost at
any node v of P is covered by a reward of (1 + τ)α/b, i.e., dβ(v),c˜(v) = β(v)((1 + τ)α/b). All that
remains to be shown is that this reward is also sufficient if the agent is located on a node v not on P .
For this purpose, let v′ be the last node of P the agent visited before reaching v. Furthermore, let
(v,w) and (v′, w′) denote the two edges the agent plans to take when located at v and v′ respectively.
According to the same argument we made in the proof of Theorem 1, it holds true that a cheapest path
from w′ to twith respect to c˜ is more expensive than a cheapest path from w to t, i.e., dc˜(w) ≤ dc˜(w′).
We also know that τc(v,w) ≤ c˜(v′, w′) and c˜(v,w) = 0 hold true by construction of c˜. Finally the
definition of τ = maxB/minB implies that β(v) ≥ β(v′)/τ . Combining these inequalities yields
dβ(v),c˜(v) ≤ dβ(v),c˜(v,w) = β(v)
(c(v,w)
β(v)
+ d(w)
)
≤ β(v)
( c(v,w)
β(v′)/τ
+ d(w)
)
≤ β(v)
( c˜(v′, w′) + c(v′w′)
β(v′)
+ d(w′)
)
=
β(v)
β(v′)
dβ(v′),c˜(v
′, w′).
Recall that the agent already traversed (v′, w′). Therefore her perceived cost of (v′, w′) is at most
dβ(v′),c˜(v
′, w′) ≤ β(v′)((1 + τ)α/b), implying that
dβ(v),c˜(v) ≤
β(v)
β(v′)
β(v′)
(
(1 + τ)α/b
)
= β(v)
(
(1 + τ)α/b
)
.
This completes the proof.
Although VARIABLEPRESENTBIASAPPROX yields a good approximation for a moderately vari-
able present bias, it does not provide a constant approximation bound like UNCERTAINPRESENT-
BIASAPPROX. However, this is not necessarily a shortcoming of the algorithm, but a complexity
consequence. To prove hardness for constant factor approximations of VPB-OPT, we consider the
VECTOR SCHEDULING (VS) problem.
Definition 6 (VS-OPT). Given m machines denoted by the sets M1, . . . ,Mm and ℓ jobs in the form
of d-dimensional vectors q1, . . . , qℓ ∈ Rd≥0, find the smallest makespan over all dimensions, i.e.,
minimize max{‖∑q∈Mi q‖∞ | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} with respect to all partitions of the jobs into sets
M1, . . . ,Mm.
As Chekuri and Khanna have shown, VS-OPT is unlikely to have an efficient constant factor
approximation [4].
Theorem 3. No polynomial time algorithm approximates VS-OPT within a constant factor ̺ > 1,
unless NP = ZPP. This holds true even if the problem is restricted to 0-1 vectors.
By reducing VS-OPT to VPB-OPT, we are able to prove that VPB-OPT is unlikely to have an
efficient constant factor approximation as well.
Theorem 4. No polynomial time algorithm approximates VPB-OPT within a constant factor ̺ > 1,
unless NP = ZPP.
Proof. Our proof is based on the following reduction from VS-OPT. Let I be an arbitrary instance
of VS-OPT with a set of m machines and ℓ ≥ 2 jobs q1, . . . , qℓ ∈ {0, 1}d. Our goal is to construct
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Figure 3: A column Hi,j of the task graph G
an instance J of VPB-OPT with a size polynomial in that of I such that the following two claims
are satisfied: (a) If I has a schedule with a makespan of κ, then J has a cost configuration that is
motivating for a reward of r = κℓ + ℓ + 1. (b) If J has a cost configuration that is motivating for a
reward of r, then I has a schedule with a makespan of at most κ = 2r/ℓ. Consequently, if we have
a polynomial time algorithm for VPB-OPT with a constant approximation ratio ̺, we can apply this
algorithm to J and recover a 2̺ + O(1) approximate solution for I in polynomial time. According
to Theorem 3 this is not possible unless NP = ZPP.
As our first step we need to construct the VPB-OPT instance J . In particular, we need to specify
a present bias set B and a task graph G. We begin with B. From Theorem 2 we know that VPB-OPT
has a (1 + τ)-approximation algorithm. Consequently, we should choose B in such a way that its
range depends on the size of I . Furthermore, Proposition 4 implies that B should not include the
value 1. For the sake of simplicity we set B = {1/2, 1/ℓ2}.
We continue with the construction of G. For this purpose we introduce a column Hi,j for each
machine i and dimension j. The structure of these columns, which is illustrated in Figure 3, is identical
for all machines and dimensions. More precisely, each columnHi,j consists of ℓ levels and each level
k, with 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ, consists of a directed path starting at a node vi,j,k and ending at wi,j,k. In between
there are ℓ4 edges of cost 1/ℓ2 resulting in a total path cost of ℓ2. Furthermore, each node of the path
has a shortcut to the next level k + 1, or to t in the special case of k = ℓ. For a convenient notation
let t = vi,j,ℓ+1. We distinguish between two types of shortcuts. Shortcuts of the first type connect
vi,j,k with vi,j,k+1 via two edges of cost 0 and 1 respectively. Shortcuts of the second type connect
all remaining nodes on level k with vi,j,k+1 via a single edge of cost ℓ. For the sake of a concise
representation Figure 3 merges some shortcuts.
To connect the individual columns, we construct a path Pi,k for each machine i and job qk. The
idea of Pi,k is to cross the k-th level of all columns Hi,j for which qk has a cost of 1 in dimension j,
i.e., (qk)j = 1. As start and endpoint of Pi,k we introduce additional nodes ui−1 and ui and set s = u0
and t = uℓ. A more formal construction of Pi,k is as follows: Let j be an arbitrary dimension for
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Figure 4: Reduction from a VS instance with 2machines and jobs q1 = (0, 1), q2 = (1, 0), q3 = (1, 1)
which (qk)j = 1. Without loss of generality we may assume that at least one such dimension exists.
Otherwise, qk could be assigned to any machine without affecting the makespan and would therefore
be irrelevant to the schedule. If j is the dimension of lowest index satisfying (qk)j = 1, we draw an
edge of cost 1/ℓ2 from uk−1 to vi,j,k. Similarly, we draw an edge of cost 1/ℓ
2 from wi,j,k to uk if j
is the dimension of highest index for which (qk)j = 1. For all intermediate dimensions j satisfying
(qk)j = 1, we draw an edge of cost 1/ℓ
2 from wi,j,k to a distinct intermediate node ui,j,k and another
edge of the same cost from ui,j,k to vi,j′,k with j
′ being the dimension of next higher index satisfying
(qk)j′ = 1. Figure 4 illustrates this construction for a small sample instance of I . Note that the nodes
u1 and u2 appear twice in the figure, once on the left and once on the right, to keep the drawing simple.
To complete our construction, we introduce a third type of shortcuts connecting all nodes uk 6= t
and ui,j,k to t via a single edge of cost ℓ. For the sake of a clear representation these shortcuts are
not depicted in Figure 4. Note that the resulting task graph G is acyclic and can be constructed in
polynomial time with respect to I . It should also be mentioned that some columns ofGmight contain
nodes which are not reachable from s. However, as argued in Section 2 we may ignore these nodes as
they do not affect the agent’s behavior and can be removed from G in polynomial time.
We proceed with the proof of statement (a), i.e., given a partition of jobs M1, . . . ,Mm for I
resulting in a makespan κ, we show how to construct a cost configuration c˜ such that J is motivating
for a reward of κℓ + ℓ + 1. The construction of c˜ is simple. For each job qk it is sufficient to assign
an extra cost of ℓ to the initial edge of all shortcuts starting at a node vi,j,k for which i is the machine
qk is scheduled on, i.e., qk ∈ Mi, and j is a dimension in which qk has a cost of 1, i.e., (qk)j = 1.
Furthermore, an extra cost of κℓ + ℓ + 2 needs to be assigned to the initial edge of all paths Pi′,k
associated with the machines i′ job qk is not scheduled on, i.e., qk /∈Mi′ .
To show that c˜ is motivating for a reward of κℓ+ ℓ+1, we argue that an agent with a present bias
configuration β ∈ BV successfully constructs a path from s to t that only consists of paths Pi,k for
which qk ∈Mi and possibly a shortcut of the third type. For this purpose, assume the agent is located
at some node v 6= t on Pi,k. A case distinction with respect to the type of v shows that the agent either
stays on Pi,k or takes a shortcut of the third type. As the paths Pi,k are connected at their terminal
nodes, this proves the claim.
We begin with the case v = uk−1. When located at such a node v the agent has three choices.
First, she might plan to enter a path Pi′,k for which i
′ 6= i. However, c˜ assigns an extra cost of
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κℓ + ℓ + 2 to the initial edge of Pi′,k. Therefore the agent is not motivated to take Pi′,k no matter
what the exact value of β(v) is. Secondly, the agent might plan to enter Pi,k from v. If she plans
to follow the shortcuts of the first kind all the way to t after traversing the first edge of Pi,k, she
faces an immediate edge of cost 1/ℓ2 and at most ℓ future edges of cost 1, one per subsequent level.
Furthermore, the number of future edges with an extra cost of ℓ is bounded by the makespan κ.
Considering that 1/ℓ2 ≤ β(v), we conclude that the agent’s perceived cost for entering Pi,k is at most
1/ℓ2 + β(v)(ℓ + κℓ) ≤ β(v) + β(v)(ℓ + κℓ) = β(v)(κℓ + ℓ + 1). As this matches her perceived
reward, entering Pi,k must be motivating. Thirdly, the agent might plan to take the shortcut of the
third type from v. If she does so, she immediately reaches t. If not, the only motivating option that
remains is Pi,k. Either way our claim holds true.
We continue with the case v = ui,j,k, which is very similar to the previous one. Again the agent
may either stay on Pi,k or take the shortcut of the third type. Analyzing the perceived cost of these
two options is identical to the previous case. The only difference is that the agent is missing the first
option, which is to enter a path Pi′,k for which i
′ 6= i. However, this does not affect her motivation to
stay on Pi,k nor does it affect the possibility of her taking the shortcut.
Next we consider the case that v is a node on the k-th level of some column Hi,j different
from wi,j,k. When located at v the agent has two choices. Either she takes the immediate shortcut inci-
dent to v or she traverses an edge of Pi,k. Her perceived cost of the first option is ℓ+β(v)dc˜(vi,j,k+1)
while her perceived cost of the second option is at most 1/ℓ2 + β(v)(ℓ + dc˜(vi,j,k+1)) if she plans
to take the shortcut of the second type immediately after traversing the edge of Pi,k. Consequently,
the agent prefers to stay on Pi,k whenever ℓ > 1/ℓ
2 + β(v)ℓ or 1 − 1/ℓ3 > β(v) if we rearrange the
inequality. Considering that ℓ ≥ 2 and β(v) ≤ 1/2 hold true, this inequality is certainly satisfied. It
remains to show that staying on Pi,k is also a motivating option. However, following the same line of
argument we have used for the perceived cost of Pi,k in the case v = ui,j,k, this should be easy to see.
Finally, we consider the remaining case v = wi,j,k. Similar to the previous case the agent has two
options. Either she takes the immediate shortcut incident to v or she traverses Pi,k and ends up at ui,j,k.
Her perceived cost of the first option is ℓ + β(v)dc˜(vi,j,k+1) ≥ ℓ. In contrast, if she moves to ui,j,k
and then takes the shortcut of the third kind immediately after, her perceived cost is 1/ℓ2 + β(v)ℓ. As
a result she prefers the first option whenever ℓ > 1/ℓ2+β(v)ℓ. But from the previous case we already
know that this inequality is always satisfied. Furthermore, the fact that 1/ℓ2 ≤ β(v) implies that the
agent’s perceived cost for moving to ui,j,k is at most 1/ℓ
2+β(v)ℓ ≤ β(v)+β(v)ℓ ≤ β(v)(κℓ+ℓ+1).
As this matches her perceived reward, we know that moving to ui,j,k is motivating.
We now come to the proof of (b). For this purpose assume J has a cost configuration c˜ that is
motivating for a reward of r. Our goal is to schedule the jobs of I with a makespan of at most 2r/ℓ.
Since any schedule has a makespan less or equal to ℓ, we focus on the case r < ℓ2/2. As a result,
the agent’s perceived reward becomes r/ℓ2 < 1/2 whenever her present bias takes the value 1/ℓ2.
However, this implies that the agent must not take shortcuts of the first kind. The reason is that
her perceived cost at the intermediate node of the shortcut is at least 1 and therefore she might lose
motivation. Furthermore, the agent is not motivated to take shortcuts of the second or third type
whenever her present bias is 1/ℓ2. Consequently, if we fix the agent’s present bias to β(v) = 1/ℓ2 at
all nodes v of G, she must construct a path P from s to t that does not contain shortcuts of any type.
This means that P can be divided into a sequence of paths Pi,k. By assigning job qk to machine i if
Pi,k is contained in P we obtain a feasible partition M1, . . . ,Mm.
Next we argue that the makespan ofM1, . . . ,Mm is at most 2r/ℓ. For this purpose we first show
that c˜ must assign an extra cost of at least ℓ/2− 1 to all shortcuts starting at a node vi,j,k for which qk
is scheduled on i, i.e., qk ∈ Mi. For this purpose, assume the agent is located at vi,j,k. Note that this
scenario is indeed possible if β(v) = 1/ℓ2 for all nodes v of P that come before vi,j,k. Furthermore,
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assume that β(vi,j,k) = 1/2. As we have argued in the previous paragraph, the agent must not take
the shortcut at vi,j,k, but stay on Pi,k. Let P
′ denote her planned path. We distinguish between
two possible scenarios for P ′. First, P ′ might follow the path Pi,k until the agent reaches another
column or the node uk. In this case, the first ℓ
4 + 1 edges of P ′ are all of cost 1/ℓ2. As a result,
the perceived cost of P ′ is at least 1/ℓ2 + β(vi,j,k)ℓ
2 = 1/ℓ2 + ℓ2/2. Considering that r < ℓ2/2,
this cannot be motivating. Secondly, P ′ might contain a shortcut of the second type to the next
level of Hi,j . Even if we neglect potential extra cost c˜ may assign to the current level of Hi,j and
furthermore assume that the agent takes the very next shortcut, her perceived cost of P ′ is at least
1/ℓ2 + β(vi,j,k)(ℓ + dc˜(vi,j,k+1)) in this case. In contrast, the agent’s perceived cost for taking the
immediate shortcut at vi,j,k is only β(vi,j,k)(1 + dc˜(vi,j,k+1)) if we neglect potential extra cost. Since
the agent must not enter the shortcut at vi,j,k, we conclude that the cost configuration c˜ assigns an
extra cost greater than 1/ℓ2 + β(vi,j,k)(ℓ− 1) > ℓ/2− 1 to the shortcut.
To see that the makespan of our schedule is at most 2r/ℓ, consider the workload κ on an arbitrary
machine i in an arbitrary dimension j. Assuming that κ > 0, let qk be the job of lowest index
scheduled on i such that (qk)i = 1. Furthermore, assume that the agent is located at vi,j,k and that
her current present bias is β(vi,j,k) = 1/ℓ
2. As argued in the previous paragraph, this assumption is
justified. We continue with a case distinction on the path P ′ the agent plans when located at vi,j,k.
In general, P ′ can have one of the following two forms: Either it exits column Hi,k to the right or
it is completely contained in Hi,k and climbs to the top level via shortcuts of the first and or second
type. If P ′ exits to the right, it must contain at least ℓ4 + 1 edges costing 1/ℓ2 each. Clearly, the
agent’s perceived cost of such a P ′ is at least 1/ℓ2 + β(vi,j,k)(ℓ
4/ℓ2) > 1 and cannot be motivating
for a perceived reward β(vi,j,k)r = r/ℓ
2 < 1/2. However, this means that some path P ′ of the
second form must be motivating. In this case, P ′ consists of at least κ shortcuts that according to the
result from the previous paragraph all have a cost of at least ℓ/2 with respect to c˜. As a result, the
perceived cost of P ′ is at least β(vi,j,k)κℓ/2 = κ/(2ℓ). To make sure that this cost does not exceed
β(vi,j,k)r = r/ℓ
2, the total load κ of machine i in dimension j can be at most 2r/ℓ.
4.2 Occasionally Unbiased Agents
Although VPB is hard to solve in general, a curious special case consisting of all present bias sets
B for which 1 ∈ B is not. Note that agents whose present bias varies within such a B becomes
temporarily unbiased whenever 1 is drawn. For this reason we call these agents occasionally unbiased.
A behavioral pattern unique to occasionally unbiased agents is that they may start to walk along a
cheapest path at any point in time whenever their present bias becomes 1. As a result we can reduce
VPB to a decision problem we call CRITICAL NODE SET (CNS) for occasionally unbiased agents.
Definition 7 (CNS). Given a task graph G, present bias set B and reward r, decide the existence of
a critical node setW .
We consider a node set W critical if the following properties hold: (a) s ∈ W . (b) Each node
v ∈ W has a path P to t that only uses nodes of W . (c) All edges e of P satisfy db(e) ≤ br with
b = minB. As it turns out, such a W contains exactly those nodes an occasionally unbiased agent
may visit with respect to a motivating cost configuration. This allows us to reduce VPB to CNS.
Proposition 4. Assuming that 1 ∈ B, then VPB has a solution if and only if CNS has one.
Proof. (⇒) To prove the first implication, assume a critical node setW exists. Our goal is to construct
a cost configuration c˜ that is motivating for all β ∈ BV . For this purpose, we assign an extra cost of
c˜(v,w) = r + 1 to all edges (v,w) that leave W , i.e., all edges for which v ∈ W but w /∈ W , and
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Algorithm 2: DECIDECRITICALNODESET
1 δ(t)← 0;
2 foreach v ∈ V \ {t} in reverse topological order do
3 U ← {w | (v,w) ∈ E and c(v,w) + βδ(w) ≤ b};
4 if U = ∅ then δ(v)←∞; else δ(v)← min{c(v,w) + δ(w) | w ∈ U};
5 if δ(s) <∞ then return “yes” else return “no”;
set c˜(e) = 0 for the remaining edges. The resulting c˜ is motivating for two reasons: (a) Whenever
the agent is inside W , she is not motivated to leave W . (b) Each node v ∈ W \ {t} has at least one
successor w ∈W the agent is motivated to visit next. Together with the fact that s ∈W we conclude
that the agent moves throughW until she eventually reaches t.
In the following we show (a) and (b). Since each edge (v,w) that leaves W has an extra cost of
r + 1, the perceived cost of (v,w) trivially exceeds the agent’s perceived reward of β(v)r. Therefore
(v,w) cannot be motivating, which proves (a). We proceed with (b). For each node v ∈ W \ {t}
we need to show the existence of a direct successor w ∈ W such that (v,w) is motivating for all
β(v) ∈ B. To prove this, remember that W is a critical node set. Consequently, there must exist a
path P = v,w, . . . , t that consists exclusively of nodes fromW such that c(v,w)+b
∑
e∈P ′ c(e) ≤ br,
with P ′ being the path obtained by removing the initial edge of P . Because P is contained inW , no
edge of P charges extra cost. By definition of b we also know that β(v)/b ≥ 1 and we can bound the
perceived cost of (v,w) from above by
dβ(v),c˜(v,w) ≤ c(v,w) + β(v)
∑
e∈P ′
c(e) ≤ β(v)
b
(
c(v,w) + b
∑
e∈P ′
c(e)
)
≤ βr.
As this bound matches the perceived reward, (v,w) must be motivating.
(⇐) To prove the reverse, assume that G has a cost configuration c˜ such that Gc˜ is motivating for
all present bias configurations β ∈ BV . Moreover, letW ′ be the set of all nodes the agent might visit
on her path from s to t. Our goal is to argue thatW ′ is a critical node set, i.e.,W ′ meets the following
requirements: (a) s ∈W ′. (b) Each node v ∈W ′ has a path P to t that only uses nodes ofW ′. (c) All
edges e of P satisfy db(e) ≤ br with b = minB. By definition of W ′ (a) is trivially satisfied. To
prove (b) and (c), let v be some node of W ′ and choose w as the immediate successor of v the agent
visits for a present bias of β(v) = b. Furthermore, let P ′ be a cheapest path from w to t with respect
to c˜. By adding (v,w) to the initial node of P ′, we obtain a path P satisfying (b) and (c).
We first show (c). Recall that the agent is motivated to traverse (v,w) for a present bias of
β(v) = b. The fact that P ′ is a cheapest path from w to t with respect to c˜ immediately implies
that the perceived cost of P is at most
c(v,w) + b
∑
e∈P
c(e) ≤ c(v,w) + c˜(v,w) + b
∑
e∈P
(
c(e) + c˜(e)
)
= db,c˜(v,w) ≤ br.
We continue with (b). Assuming the agent is located at v, consider a present bias configuration β that
assigns a value of β(v) = b to v and β(v′) = 1 to all nodes v′ 6= v located on paths from v to t.
Because 1 ∈ B, such a present bias configuration is possible. By choice of (v,w), we also know that
the agent potentially traverses w and at that point follows a cheapest path to t with respect to c˜. Since
P ′ is such a path, we conclude that the agent may visit any node of P and therefore all nodes of P are
certainly contained inW ′.
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All that remains to show is that CNS is decidable in polynomial time. A straight forward approach
to this simple algorithmic problem is DECIDECRITICALNODESET, see Algorithm 2. The main idea
of this algorithm is simple. Going through each node v of G in reverse topological order, DECIDE-
CRITICALNODESET computes the values δ(v) denoting the cost of a cheapest path from v to t with
respect to the δ values computed so far. If the perceived cost at v with respect to δ is too expensive,
then v cannot be contained in any critical node set and the algorithm sets δ(v) = ∞. Consequently,
only nodes with δ(v) <∞ can be part of a critical node set. In particular, we know that a critical node
set exists if and only if δ(s) < ∞. Clearly, DECIDECRITICALNODESET can be executed in poly-
nomial time which proves that CNS, can be decided in polynomial time for occasionally unbiased
agents. As a corollary of Proposition 4, so can VPB.
Corollary 4. If 1 ∈ B, then VPB can be solved in polynomial time.
4.3 The Price of Variability
To conclude our work, we take a step back from computational considerations and look at the im-
plications of variability from a more general perspective. Our goal is to quantify the conceptual loss
of efficiency incurred by going from a fixed and known present bias to an unpredictable and variable
one. Similar to the price of uncertainty we define the price of variability as the following ratio.
Definition 8 (Price of Variability). Given a task graph G and a present bias set B, the price of
variability is defined as r(G,BV )/ sup{r(G, {β}) | β ∈ B}.
It seems obvious that the price of variability depends closely on the structure of G and B. Never-
theless, we would like to find general bounds for the price of variability much like we did in Section 3
for the price of uncertainty. As a first step, it is instructive to note that the price of uncertainty is a
natural lower bound for the price of variability. The reason for this is that each cost configuration
that motivates an agent whose present bias varies arbitrarily in B must also motivate an agent whose
present bias is a fixed value from B. Therefore it holds true that r(G,BV ) ≥ r(G,B), which im-
mediately implies the stated bound. Sometimes this bound is tight. Consider for instance Alice and
Bob’s scenario. As we have shown in Section 3, it is possible to construct a cost configuration c˜ veri-
fying a price of uncertainty of 1. Using similar arguments, it is easy to see that c˜ remains motivating
if we allow the present bias to vary, implying an identical price of variability. However, for general
instances of G and B this tight relation between the price of uncertainty and the price of variability is
lost. In fact, we can show that unlike the price of uncertainty, which has a constant upper bound of 2,
the price of variability may become arbitrarily large as the range of B increases.
Proposition 5. There exists a family of task graphs and present bias sets for which the price of
variability converges to τ/2.
Proof. To obtain a price of variability close to τ/2 we consider an occasionally unbiased agent with
respect to the set B = {a, 1} for some 0 < a < 1/2 such that 1/a is integral. Furthermore, we
construct a task graph G consisting of a directed path v0, v1, . . . , v1/a2+1/a+2 whose edges are all of
cost 1. We call this the main path. In addition to the main path we introduce 1/a2 + 1 shortcuts via a
common node w. Each shortcut i with 0 ≤ i ≤ 1/a2 consists of two edges. The first edge goes from
vi to w for a cost of 2 while the second edge goes from w to t for a cost of 1/a. As source and target
node, we choose s = v0 and t = v1/a2+1/a+2. Figure 5 shows a sketch of G. Note that some edges of
the shortcuts are merged for the sake of a concise representation.
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Figure 5: Task graph with a price of variability of (1/a2)/(2/a + 2)
The remainder of the proof has a similar structure to that of Proposition 2. We first argue that a
reward of 2/a + 2 is sufficiently motivating for any agent with a fixed present bias of either a or 1,
implying sup{r(G, {a}), r(G, {1})} ≤ 2/a + 2. We then show that no cost configuration c˜ can
motivate an occasionally unbiased agent for a reward less than 1/a2, i.e., r(G, {a, 1}V ) ≥ 1/a2. As
a result, the price of variability must be at least (1/a2)/(2/a + 2). Note that this term approaches
1/(2a) = τ/2 as a→ 0, which establishes the theorem.
To see that a reward of 2/a + 2 is sufficiently motivating for an agent with a fixed present bias of
a, assume such an agent is located at an arbitrary node vi with 0 ≤ i ≤ 1/a2+1/a+1. Her perceived
cost for traversing (vi, vi+1) is at most da(vi, vi+1) ≤ 1 + a(2 + 1/a) = 2 + 2a if she plans to take
the next shortcut at vi+1. In the special case of i = 1/a
2, her perceived cost is da(v1/a2 , v1/a2+1) = 1
as she can reach t directly via (v1/a2 , v1/a2+1). Either way, a reward of r = 1/a(2 + 2a) = 2/a + 2
covers her perceived cost for staying on the main path. In contrast, taking the immediate shortcut at
vi has a perceived cost of da(vi, w) = 2 + a(1/a) = 3. As we assume a < 1/2, the agent clearly
perceives shortcuts as more expensive than the main path. Consequently, she follows the main path
from s to t for a reward of 1/a(2 + 2a) = 2/a+ 2.
Next consider an unbiased agent, i.e., an agent with a fixed present bias of 1. Such an agent strictly
follows a cheapest path P from s to t. Furthermore, her perceived cost along P never exceeds the
total cost of P . Taking the first shortcut at s, we can bound the cost of a cheapest path from s to t
from above by 2 + 1/a < 2/a + 2. This implies that the unbiased agent successfully reaches t for a
reward of 2/a + 2.
It remains to show that no cost configuration c˜ can be motivating for all present bias configurations
β ∈ {1, a}V if the reward is less than 1/a2. For the sake of contradiction, assume such a c˜ exists.
Note that the agent must not visit w. The reason is that a reward of less than 1/a2 is not sufficient to
make her traverse (w, t) should her present bias become β(w) = a. However, to prevent the agent
from taking a shortcut, c˜ must assign a cost greater than 1/a2 − i to all shortcuts i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 1/a2.
We proof this claim via an induction on i. For the base of the induction, let i = 1/a2. At v1/a2 , exactly
2 + 1/a edges remain on the main path. Ignoring extra cost, there are two cheapest paths to t, one
along the main path and one along the current shortcut. Consequently, if we assume that the agent is
momentarily unbiased, i.e., β(v1/a2) = 1, and therefore takes a cheapest path from s to t, it becomes
clear that c˜ must assign an extra cost greater than 0 = 1/a2 − i to the current shortcut to prevent the
agent from moving to w.
For the induction step let i < 1/a2 and assume that each shortcut j with i < j ≤ 1/a2 has an
extra cost greater than 1/a2 − j. Our goal is to argue that the extra cost assigned to the shortcut i
must be greater than 1/a2 − j. When located at vi, exactly 1/a2 − i + 1/a + 2 edges of the main
path remain to t. If the agent is currently unbiased, she perceives a cost of at least 1/a2 − i+1/a+2
for taking the main path. Clearly she cannot reduce this cost by planning to take a shortcut j′ with
j′ > 1/a2. Should she consider a shortcut j with i < j ≤ 1/a2 instead, she must first traverse (j − i)
edges of the main path. Together with the induction hypothesis her total perceived cost for such a plan
is at least (j − i) + 2 + 1/a + (1/a2 − j) = 1/a2 − i+ 1/a + 2. Consequently, her perceived cost
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for staying on the main path is at least 1/a2 − i + 1/a + 2. Since this exceeds the cost of shortcut i
by at least 1/a2 − i, we know that an extra cost greater than 1/a2 − i must be assigned to the current
shortcut to prevent the agent from walking onto w. This concludes the induction.
We now know that all shortcuts i with 0 ≤ i ≤ 1/a2 have an extra cost greater than 1/a2 − i.
By the same argument we have used in the inductive step it should be clear that each path from s to
t has a cost of at least 1/a2 + 1/a + 2. Therefore if the agent is unbiased at s, we need a reward of
1/a2 + 1/a+ 2 > 1/a to motivate her. However, this contradicts our initial assumption on c˜.
Although Proposition 5 implies that the price of variability can become substantially larger than
the price of uncertainty, it should be noted that the task graph constructed in the proof of this propo-
sition is close to a worst case scenario. In particular, we can show that the price of variability cannot
exceed τ +1, which is roughly twice the value obtained by Proposition 5. To verify this upper bound,
it is helpful to recall the proof of Theorem 2. In the process of establishing the approximation ratio
of VARIABLEPRESENTBIASAPPROX we have argued that the cost configuration c˜ returned by the
algorithm motivates any agent with a present bias configuration β ∈ BV for a reward of at most
(τ +1)r(G, {minB}). Consequently, it holds true that r(G,BV ) ≤ (τ+1)r(G, {minB}), implying
that the price of variability cannot exceed τ + 1.
Corollary 5. The price of variability is at most τ + 1.
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